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Accountability Through Transparency and the Role of the Court of Justice  
 
 




This paper assesses transparency, an integral part of accountability, through 
the access to documents rules. Transparency is viewed here as an ongoing 
process capable of securing, through a set of binding rules, open performance 
in the decision-making process. Seen from this perspective, access to 
documents is considered to be an essential accountability component, since 
without information on what basis decisions are being taken, and by whom, it 
is impossible for the various accountability forums to hold the actors to 
account. The paper reviews transparency and freedom of information in the 
European Union (EU) by taking a holistic approach to the past 20 years. The 
aim is to explore transparency by means of access to “government” 
information and to investigate a twofold question: How open can the Union’s 
decision-making be and is it possible for citizens to participate in the decision-
making process of institutions, bodies, offices and agencies? This paper 
concludes that accountability deficits in the field of access to documents have 
been filled, to a certain extent, by the EU Courts’ imposition of boundaries on 
some of the broad derogations to the right. Nevertheless, this has come at the 
cost of introducing a set of general presumptions against access which 





This paper takes as its focal point the problematic aspects of the access to 
documents regime and the interrelationship with accountability. It is often 
alleged that the EU’s decision-making is insufficiently transparent and that 
accountability deficits are even growing, something which compromises the 
Union’s overall legitimacy.1 Given that the EU has now developed into a 
political Union with policies that go far beyond the original aims of eliminating 
the barriers to cross border economic activities, it becomes pressing to secure 
for a sufficient degree of transparency that enables monitoring of the EU’s 
decision-making. This paper therefore assesses, from a historical perspective, 
the contribution of the EU’s institutions in the area of transparency.  
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The paper starts by examining the efforts introduced by the Maastricht Treaty 
in 19922 for the recognition of a “right” to access official information. It then 
reviews the Code of Conduct regarding access to documents established in 
1993. Finally, the paper examines the developments of Regulation 
1049/2001(hereafter the Regulation) on access to documents of the European 
Parliament (EP), the Council and the Commission.3 A significant part of this 
historical analysis covers the jurisprudence of the EU Courts over the past 20 
years and assesses whether they have contributed to openness and, if so, to 
what extent, by increasing the transparency standards of a Union which 
supposedly belongs to EU citizens. 
 
A detailed investigation of the abovementioned developments reveals that 
access to documents of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies has 
been increased to a considerable extent, especially when one compares the 
situation which existed before 1992 when secrecy and closed doors were the 
norm.4 Yet, had the Regulation been construed in a more liberal way by the 
Courts, the EU’s decision-making could have been more transparent. In what 
follows, the developments to date are described so that the question of what 
remains to be done can be addressed. In the end, the process to recast the 
existing Regulation is reviewed to illustrate whether the EU is ready to adopt a 
measure which would support citizens’ participation in the decision-making 
process.  
 
Overview of the legislative background 
 
The problems that arose during the process of ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty5 emphasised the extent to which the EU has become disconnected 
from its citizens. There was a widespread notion that the Union’s decision-
making process lacked accountability and legitimacy.6 For these reasons, the 
EU’s institutions had to consider alternatives that would rectify this public 
disinterest and would bring the Union closer to the citizens. Access to 
documents was seen as the solution and has been at the core of 
transparency efforts.7  
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The initial step which was proved to be the cornerstone of the public’s 
fundamental right to information was a Declaration on transparency attached 
to the Final Act of the Maastricht Treaty. This provided: 
 
“The Conference considers that transparency of the decision-making 
process strengthens the democratic nature of the institutions and the 
public’s confidence in the administration. The Conference accordingly 
recommends that the Commission submit to the Council no later than 
1993 a report on measures designed to improve public access to the 
information available to the institutions.”8  
 
Declaration No. 17, quoted above, illustrated the willingness for the 
establishment of a “right” of access to information and is commonly 
considered as the beginning of a transparent era in the EU.9 This political 
statement, technically not binding, constitutes a type of soft law and not a rule 
of law of higher order which the previous rules would be deemed invalid for 
not complying with.10 In response to the Declaration and with the aim of 
bringing the Union closer to the citizens, the Commission first surveyed 
national law on access to documents and then released a communication on 
the issue.11 In 1993, transparency was emphasised by the inter-institutional 
Declaration on Democracy, Transparency and Subsidiarity.12 Finally, in the 
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same year the Code of Conduct13 on access to documents was adopted and 
shortly afterwards implemented by the Council14 and the Commission.15  
 
The pre-Regulation regime: The Code of Conduct  
 
The basic principle enshrined in the Code was the “widest possible access to 
documents”16 and the narrowest interpretation of the exceptions, since the 
latter is a corollary of the former17 and “a fundamental standard of legal 
interpretation”.18 The Code provided for access to be denied where disclosure 
could undermine the protection of certain public and private interests. The 
exceptions covered: 
 
• The protection of the public interest (exemplified by public security, 
international relations, monetary stability, Court proceedings, inspections 
and investigations); 
 
• the protection of the individual and of privacy; 
 
• the protection of industrial and commercial secrecy; 
 
• the protection of the Union’s financial interests; and 
 
• the protection of confidentiality as requested by the natural or legal 
persons who supplied the information or as required by the legislation of 
the Member State that supplied the information. 
 
The very wide non-exhaustive list of mandatory exceptions,19 quoted above, 
changed the balance from positive rights with negative exceptions to a text 
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which treated access as the exception.20 That the Code’s exceptions were 
dangerously restrictive was understood immediately by the Netherlands21 and 
in a Court case the legal basis of the Code was questioned. It was posited 
that the Council relied incorrectly on measures of internal organisation to 
regulate the fundamental democratic right of access. The same approach was 
taken by the Advocate General Tesauro, who concurred that the public’s right 
to access the official documents is based on democracy which constitutes one 
of the cornerstones of the Union. The Court of Justice, however, held that the 
institutions were entitled to have access rules based solely on their internal 
rules of procedure.22 
 
Even after the enactment of the Code there was dissatisfaction with the state 
of openness.23 The Council and the Commission, based on a system of 
secrecy, were reluctant to implement the Code in favour of openness.24 This 
led to the consistent refusal of various documents. As a result, the EU Courts 
handed down several judgments interpreting the Council’s and the 
Commission’s decisions denying access under the Code. The contribution of 
the Courts has been, to a greater or lesser extent, significant in supporting a 
culture of openness and accountability in the EU.25 The Court of First 
Instance, now the General Court, held, for instance, that the institutions after 
having adopted internal rules on access were abiding by them and any 
exceptions to the principle of the widest access must be justified on objective 
grounds and be applied strictly in a manner that did not defeat the application 
of the widest possible access.26 More importantly, the Courts ruled that 
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abstract and general justifications could not be accepted and that the 
institutions were obliged to carry out a concrete and individual assessment of 
the requested documents before deciding whether or not to release them.27  
 
During the early case law, the protection of confidentiality proved to be the 
most widely used exception. Pursuant to art. 4.2 of Council Decision 93/731, 
“access to a Council document may be refused in order to protect the 
confidentiality of the Council’s proceedings”.28 In Carvel,29 the application was 
rejected on the grounds that the documents “refer directly to the deliberations 
of the Council and its preparatory instances. If it did allow access, the Council 
would fail to protect the confidentiality of its proceedings”.30 In holding that the 
Council had erred, the Court ruled that when an applicant requests 
documents that fall under the confidentiality exception, the institution needs to 
genuinely balance its own interest in preserving the secrecy of its 
deliberations against the citizen’s countervailing interest. When the protection 
of confidentiality outweighs the citizen’s interest, access is denied. Clearly, a 
blanket refusal to grant access to a class of documents infringes art. 4(2). 
  
The institutions were required to examine concretely and individually the 
documents requested and to state reasons based on the exceptions in 
respect of each of the requested documents if access was to be refused.31 
The risk of the public or private interest being undermined must be reasonably 
foreseeable and not purely hypothetical.32 The Court of First Instance ruled in 
Kuijer (II)33 that the Council had wrongly applied the exception of the 
international relations. The Council failed to consider whether there was a risk 
that would prejudice the Union’s relations with third countries. Instead of 
making this specific examination, refusal was based on general statements 
and assumptions rather than on an analysis of factors which effectively may 
undermine the exception. Yet, in limited circumstances, the requirement of 
one by one examination can be abandoned under the “administrative burden 
rule” and the institutions can balance the work that they will have to bear 
against the public interest in gaining access. In other words, excessive 
administrative work caused by a request may allow the institution to derogate 
from the principle of widest access.34 Not surprisingly, practice provides 
                                                                                                                                           
documents relating to investigations which may lead to an infringement procedure according 
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evidence that this is open to abuse by the institutions. (See section about 
administrative burden post Regulation).    
 
The “authorship rule”, contained in the Code of Conduct and in the 
corresponding Council and Commission Decisions, constituted a significant 
limitation from the standpoint of someone who wanted to access certain 
documents. Pursuant to this rule, access to documents which each of the two 
institutions did not draw up shall be denied and must be directed to the 
author. The rule was confirmed by the early case law of the EU Courts. In 
Rothmans,35 the then Court of First Instance ruled for the first time on the 
authorship rule by holding that requests regarding documents prepared by 
third persons must be directed to those persons and that the institutions had 
no authority to disclose them. The Court highlighted that this exception 
constituted a restriction to the right of access and must be treated as such 
and be interpreted and applied strictly. Thus, for the purposes of the access 
rules and by applying the general principle of the widest possible access to 
documents, the Court ruled that comitology committees assisting the 
Commission in implementing the legislation are part of the Commission and 
not separate entities.36 The validity of the authorship rule was upheld by the 
Court of First Instance in Interporc II.37 
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam 
 
The accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden38 in 1995 and the fact that 
domestic legislation of most Member States recognises, at Constitutional or 
legislative level, the right of access, impacted positively on transparency in the 
EU. The Treaty of Amsterdam provided that decisions need to be taken as 
openly and closely as possible to the citizen (art.1 TEU) and hence prevented 
openness from being an absolute right.39 Additionally, under art. 255 EC any 
EU citizen and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered 
office in a Member State could have access to EP, Council and Commission 
documents. Access was to be denied for the protection of public and private 
interests to be determined by the Council under the then co-decision 
                                                                                                                                           
Leino, “Darkness at the Break of Noon: The Case Law on Regulation No. 1049/2001 on 
Access to Documents” (2007) 43 C.M.L. Rev. 735; A. Flanagan, “EU Freedom of Information: 
Determining where the Interest Lies” (2007) 13 E.P.L. 595. 
35Rothmans v Commission (T-188/97) [1999] E.C.R. II-2463 at 56-62; C. Bergstrom, 
Delegation of Powers in the European Union and the Committee System (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); M. Bovens, “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A conceptual 
Framework” (2007) 13 E.L.J. 454; A. Türk, “Transparency and comitology”, in C. Demmke 
and C. Engel, Continuity and Change in the European Integration Process (Maastricht: EIPA, 
2003). 
36
 Rothmans v Commission (T-188/97) [1999] E.C.R. II-2463 at [56-62]; Peers, S. and Costa, 
M. “Accountability for Delegated and Implementing Acts after the Treaty of Lisbon” (2012) 18 
E.L.J. 427. 
37
 Interporc Im- und Export GmbH v Commission (“Interporc II’) (T-92/98) [1999] E.C.R. II-
3421. 
38
 Due to their long legal and cultural heritage on openness 
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 A. Guggenbuhl, “A Miracle Formula or an Old Powder in New Packaging? Transparency 
and Openness after Amsterdam” in V. Deckmyn and I. Thomson, Openness and 
Transparency in the European Union, (Maastricht: EIPA, 1998); R.W. Davis, “Public access to 
community documents: a fundamental human right?” (1999) 3 E.I.O.P. 8. 
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procedure. For this reason, art. 255 set a time limit: within two years after the 
entry into force of the Treaty for the access to document rules to be 
adopted.40 These Treaty amendments provide with a clear evidence of the 
political consensus to incorporate the principle of transparency in the EU. 
What is less clear, however, is the exact status of transparency in the EU 
legal due to the national divergences on openness. On 30 May 2001, the 
Union adopted Regulation 1049/2001, which entered into force on 3 
December 2001 and forms the legislation on access to the documents of the 
EP, Council and the Commission. Unfortunately, this welcome development 
has had only limited legal effect, as the then Court of First Instance held that 
art. 1 TEU and art. 255 EC had no direct effect and that the latter could not be 
used for the interpretation of the pre-Regulation rules.41 That political 
consensus is also apparent from the Treaty of Lisbon which provided with 
additional contributions in favour of transparency. Pursuant to art. 15(1) TFEU 
“[i]n order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil 
society, the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct 
their work as openly as possible. Therefore, there is now a generic obligation 
upon all the EU organs to function openly: a completely distinct duty from the 
specific rules on access to documents rules.     
 
Regulation 1049/2001 and its case law 
 
Regulation 1049/2001 governs the fundamental42 right of citizens and 
residents in the EU to access, in principle, all the documents drawn or held by 
the EP, Council and Commission.43 The adoption of this measure was seen 
as a real triumph for the advocates of transparency in the EU. 44 For the first 
time in the history of European integration, EU law set out the binding 
requirements for securing the democratic right of an informed citizenry. This 
formal ability of the public to participate, influence and monitor the decision-
                                                 
40
 European Ombudsman’s speech, “Transparency as a Fundamental Principle of the 
European Union’, Humboldt University, Berlin on 19 June 2001 available at 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/activities/speech.faces/en/312/html.bookmark; J. 
Soderman, speech given to European Law Conference, Stockholm, 10-12 June 2001, “The 
citizen, the rule of law and openness’.  
41
 Petrie v Commission (T-191/99) [2001] E.C.R. II-3667 at [34-38]. 
42
 Legal scholars (and applicants before the Courts) have repeatedly argued on the 
fundamental nature of the access right. See for example D. Curtin, “Citizens”fundamental 
right of access to EU information: an evolving digital passepartout?” (2000) 37 C.M.L. Rev. 7; 
M. Bromberg, “Access to Documents: A General Principle of Community Law”, (2002) 27 E.L. 
Rev.  This discourse constitutes now a discussion for the past. Post Lisbon, art. 6 TEU 
recognizes the Charter of Fundamental Rights as legally binding granting it the same legal 
value as the Treaties. The Charter includes in art. 42 a right of access to documents. In 
addition art. 15 TFEU which is the equivalent of the ex art. 255 EC Treaty is significantly 
widened. For example it covers the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and also 
the Court of Justice, the European Central Bank and the European Investment Bank are 
covered by this provision for their administrative tasks. 
43
 Although in principle the beneficiaries of the right of access to documents are EU citizens 
and residents, art. 2(2) of the Regulation grants discretion to the EU institutions bound by it to 
grant access to any natural or legal person not residing or not having its registered office in a 
MS. The institutions responded positively to this option. See Decision 2001/840 of the Council 
(OJ 2001, L313/40, Decision 2001/937 of the Commission (OJ 2001, L 345/94 and the 
Decision of the EP (OJ 2001, L 374 /I).  
44
 I. Harden, “Citizenship and Information”, (2001) 7 E.P.L. 165. 
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making process increased the state of accountability in the EU and played a 
significant role in giving the access regime a fundamental force. There are a 
number of ambiguously unclear provisions within the Regulation, which 
highlight the significant level of political disagreement over the exact status of 
transparency in the EU legal order. This imposes an extra task on the 
judiciary to establish the right balance amongst the various interests at stake. 
The pre-Regulation case law has, to a large extent, been incorporated into 
this Regulation and the interpretation of the old rules is still applicable unless 
clearly stated otherwise.45 This is justified by Recital 3 of the Regulation’s 
Preamble, which states that the Regulation “consolidates the initiatives which 
the institutions have already taken”. 
 
The jurisprudence towards the right of access has developed two attitudes. 
The first one was described as “marginal review”, whereas the second was 
called as the “foreseeability standard”.46 The former approach relates to the 
fact that the institutions exercise wide discretion when they apply the 
exceptions47 and the latter confirms the requirement for the widest possible 
access so long as the risk to harm the protected interest is not merely 
hypothetical. In practice, the nature of the requested documents results in 
different judicial treatment. While the case law significantly increased public 
access as regards legislative documents, it has set the default position in 
regards to administrative and judicial documents to non-disclosure. These 
fundamental discrepancies, as to the nature of documents, firstly question the 
attribution of the Courts and secondly highlight that the state of transparency 
in the EU is still problematic.  
 
The Courts have consistently applied the marginal review standard,48 since 
judicial review is “limited to verifying whether the procedural rules have been 
complied with, the contested decision is properly reasoned, and the facts 
have been accurately stated, and whether there has been a manifest error of 
assessment of the facts or misuse of powers”.49 According to settled case law 
and in view of the objectives of the Regulation, certain basic principles were 
                                                 
45
 Peers, see fn. 6; H. Kranenborg, “Is it Time to Revise the European Regulation on Public 
Access to Documents?” (2006) 12 E.P.L., 251; Franchet and Byk v Commission (T-391/03 & 
T-70/04) [2006] E.C.R.II-2023 at [82] and [88] whereas the court applied and further 
developed the prior jurisprudence concerning the exceptions of the access rules. 
46
 D. Adamski, “How wide is “the widest possible’’’? Judicial interpretation of the exceptions to 
the right of access to official documents revisited”, (2009) 46 C.M.L. Rev. 521. 
47
 Kuijer v Council (Kuijer II) (T-211/00) [2002] E.C.R. II-485 at [53]: “When the Council 
decides whether the public interest may be undermined by realising a document, it exercises 
a discretion which is among the political responsibilities conferred on it by provisions of the 
Treaties”; Sison v Council (C-266/05 P) [2007] E.C.R. I-1233: “in areas covered by the 
mandatory exceptions to public access to documents , provided for in Art. 4(1) (a) of 
Regulation 1049/2001, the institutions enjoy a wide discretion”; Hautala v Council (T-14/98)  
[1999] E.C.R. II-2489 at [44]. 
48
 M. De Leeuw, “The Regulation on public access to EP, Council and Commission 
Documents in the European Union: Are citizens better off?” (2003) 28 E.L. Rev. 324; F. 
Mancini and D. Keeling, “Democracy and the European Court of Justice”, (1994) 57 M.L.R. 
175. 
49
 Hautala v Council (T-14/98) [1999] E.C.R. II-2489 at [72]. This has been confirmed as 
regards the Regulation see Sison v Council, (T-110/03, T-150/03 & T-405/03) [2005] E.C.R. 
II-1429 at [46]. 
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established and as a result the exceptions set out in art. 4 must be interpreted 
and applied strictly. It follows from this, that when the institution decides to 
rely on any of the exceptions “it must explain how access to that document 
could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by an 
exception”.50 This balancing task has been deemed essential and access 
cannot be denied without firstly appraising the requested documents on a 
case-by-case basis. Despite this careful and consistent emphasis in support 
of transparency, there is a parallel development of a set of general 
presumptions (against openness) which fits unwell and to a certain extent 
defeats the very purpose of the widest access emphasised categorically 
during the past 20 years.51 More fundamentally, this approach reveals that the 
EU Courts have taken a rather limited line on openness which necessarily 
contributes to the debate about the lack of accountability in the EU. The 
following, therefore, sets out the basic provisions of the Regulation and 
reconsiders at length the role played by the Courts in giving the access 
regime force in order to enhance the citizens’ ability to access information in 
the context of legislative, administrative and judicial documents. 
 
The purpose of the Regulation, as set out in art. 1, is “to define the principles, 
conditions and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing the 
right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents 
… in such a way as to ensure the widest possible access to documents … to 
establish rules ensuring the easiest possible exercise of this right … and to 
promote good administrative practice on access to documents”. To ensure for 
this, any European citizen and any natural or legal person residing or having 
its registered office in any of the Member States can apply to access any 
documents.52 
 
The Regulation reflects the overall intention, specified in the second 
subparagraph of art. 1 TEU, to mark a new stage in the process of creating an 
even closer Union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken 
as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen. It is noted in the Recital 2 
of the Regulation’s Preamble that there is a direct causal link to the 
fundamental right of European citizens and residents to have access with the 
democratic nature of the EU institutions.  
 
Art. 2 of the Regulation sets out the basic provisions and its wording is very 
similar to that of art. 255(1) EC Treaty, now art. 15 TFEU, whereas art. 2(3) 
defines the scope of the Regulation. This provides: 
 
“This Regulation shall apply to all documents held by an institution, that is 
to say, documents drawn up or received by it and in its possession, in all 
areas of activities of the European Union”. 
 
This marks a huge change to the pre-Regulation regime. Under the Code of 
Conduct, documents held by the institutions but authored by third parties and 
Member States needed to be directed to them since they were not covered by 
                                                 
50
 Borax v Commission (T-121/05) [2009] E.C.R. II-27. 
51
 See LPN and Finland v Commission (C-514/11 P) not yet reported. 
52
 art. 2(2) of the Regulation. 
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the access rules. This broader access constitutes undoubtedly the most 
important obvious step forward in respect of the former situation.53 Yet, the 
institutions continuously rely on art. 4 to deny access. 
 
There are four types of exceptions: mandatory, “discretionary”54, the 
protection of the decision-making process and, finally, documents originating 
from third parties and Member States. Art. 4(1) is written in mandatory terms 
and provides that:  
 
“the institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would 
undermine the protection of: 
 
(a) the public interest as regards: 
 
- public security, 
- defence and military matters, 
- international relations, 
- the financial, monetary or economic policy of the Community or a 
Member State; 
 
(b) privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance 
with the Community legislation regarding the protection of personal data”. 
 
This category of exception precludes access to any of the documents falling 
within it and calls for no balancing of interests at stake. If the institutions can 
prove that the documents fall into this category, refusal is automatically 
justified.55  
 
The second category of exceptions, set out in art. 4(2) and written again in 
mandatory terms, requires a balancing exercise of the protected interests vis-
à-vis disclosure. This provides:  
 
“[t]he institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure 
would undermine the protection of: 
 
- commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including intellectual 
property, 
- court proceedings and legal advice, 
- the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits, 
 
unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure”.  
                                                 
53
 Peers, see fn. 6; De Leeuw, see fn. 20. 
54
 The inverted commas highlight my view that this category of exceptions is not really 
discretionary since it is written in the same mandatory way as the exceptions in Art. 4(1) but 
subject to a public interest override in favour of disclosure. 
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 H. Kranenborg, “Access to documents and data protection in the European Union: On the 
public nature of personal data” (2008) 45 C.M.L. Rev. 1079; Sison v Council, [2005] E.C.R. II-
1429; Kuijer (II) v Council (T-211/00, T-110/03, T-150/03 & T-405/03) [2002] E.C.R. II-485; 
Hautala v Council, (T-14/98) [1999] E.C.R. II-2489; Sweden and Others v API and 
Commission (C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P & C-532/07 P) [2010] E.C.R. I-8533; Commission v 
Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau (C-139/07 P) [2010] E.C.R. I-5885. 
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The latter clause constitutes an “exception to the exception”56 and if 
applicable the documents need to be released. The same balancing test is 
required for the decision-making process exception, the equivalent of the 
confidentiality exception provided by the Code of Conduct. The first indent of 
art. 4(3) provides that: “Access to a document, drawn up by an institution for 
internal use or received by an institution, which relates to a matter where the 
decision has not been taken by the institution, shall be refused”. In addition, 
the second indent of art. 4(3) states that documents “containing opinions for 
internal use as part of deliberations and preliminary consultations within the 
institution concerned shall be refused even after the decision has been taken”. 
Consequently, post decision only documents drawn and not merely 
possessed by the institution cannot be disclosed.57 This type of exception 
may be invoked when it additionally passes a “stricter”58 test according to the 
final part of art. 4(3): “disclosure of the document would seriously undermine 
the institution’s decision-making process”.  
 
The application of the exceptions regarding legislative, administrative and 




In Turco,59 the applicant requested access to an opinion of the Council’s legal 
service relating to a proposal for a Council Directive laying down the minimum 
standards for the reception of applicants for asylum in Member States.60 The 
General Court, in keeping with prior case law, reiterated that denial of access 
must be based on concrete and individual examination. But nevertheless, the 
Council’s generality was justified by the fact that giving additional information 
would deprive the exception relied upon of its effect.61 The rationale behind 
the legal advice exception, according to the Court, is to avoid uncertainty by 
raising doubts over the legality of EU legislation,62 to secure independence of 
the legal service and to protect the interest of institution to receive 
independent and frank legal advice.63 In essence, the Court ruled that the 
legal advice exception should escape the well-established duty, incumbent on 
institutions, to carry out the one by one assessment of the requested 
documents and that the public interest override will never apply. This is 
because it would be impossible to conceive a different scenario than the 
Turco’s factual background which would advocate for successful acceptance 
of the override.  
 
                                                 
56
 H. Kranenborg and W. Voermans, Access to Information in the European Union: A 
Comparative Analysis of EC and Member State Legislation, (Groningen: Europa Law 
Publishing, 2005). 
57
 Batchelor v Commission (T-250/08) [2011] E.C.R. II-2551. 
58
 Kranenborg and Voermans, see fn. 56. 
59
 Turco v Council (T-84/03) [2004] E.C.R. II-4061 
60
 Turco v Council (T-84/03) at [4]. 
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 Turco v Council (T-84/03) at [74]. 
62
 Turco v Council (T-84/03) at [74]. 
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 Turco v Council (T-84/03) at [79]. 
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In relation to legislative matters, this case law can no longer be considered as 
good law. The Court of Justice, in the joined cases of Sweden and Turco v 
Council,64 invalidated the General Court’s reasoning, upheld the appeal and 
ruled that the legal advice exception given in the remit of legislative 
proceedings must be released. The judgment addressed how institutions 
should deal with disclosure requests relating to legal advice. It was held that 
when institutions are asked to disclose such a document, they must carry out 
a specific three-stage procedure that corresponds to the three criteria outlined 
in the provision.65 Firstly, the institution must consider and satisfy itself that 
the document does relate to legal advice and whether any parts are covered 
by the exception.66 The second stage is the requirement to consider whether 
disclosure of any parts of the document would undermine the protection of the 
advice.67 The Court noted that the exception must be understood in the light 
of the purpose of the Regulation. Under this, the exception “must be 
construed as aiming to protect an institution’s interest in seeking legal advice 
and receiving frank, objective and comprehensive advice”.68 Finally, it is 
incumbent on the institution to balance the interest in non-disclosure against 
any possible countervailing interest, bearing in mind the overall purpose to 
secure the widest possible access, giving a reasoned judgment.69 
 
What is most important for the interpretation given in Turco is the finding that 
that the General Court was erred in law to conclude that the raison d’être of 
the legal advice exception is not to fuel doubts over the legality of legislation. 
According to the wording of the judiciary, “it is in fact rather a lack of 
information and debate which is capable of giving rise to doubts in the minds 
of citizens, not only as regards the lawfulness of an isolated act, but also as 
regards the legitimacy of the decision-making process as a whole”.70 
Therefore, while the judgment increases public access as regards legal 
advice, it also more fundamentally places the access rules next to the 
principles of democracy and civil participation in the decision-making process. 
It does so in a way which highlights the ability of the citizenry to have access 
to information about the actions of the EU as one of its fundamental 
credentials.  
 
By upholding the appeal, the Court of Justice reintroduced the cornerstone of 
the access regime in relation to the ability of the citizenry to assess the 
impact, comment upon and influence the development of policies and finally 
hold the “government” accountable, an activity which obviously cannot take 
place without maximum access to information. It follows clearly from the 
judgment that the EU is democratic because of the ability of the citizens to 
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 Sweden and Turco v Council (C-39/05P and C-52/05P) [2008] E.C.R. I-4723. See also A. 
Arnull, “Joined Cases C-39/05 P & C-52/05 P, Sweden and Turco v. Council, judgment of the 
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65
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 Sweden and Turco v Council (C-39/05P and C-52/05P) at [40]. 
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69
 Sweden and Turco v Council (C-39/05P and C-52/05P) at [44]. 
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stay informed. Similarly, the overriding public interest pressing for disclosure 
of the legal advice needs to be no different from the principles of openness, 
transparency, democracy and civil participation in the decision-making 
process which already underlie the Regulation.71 The last limb of balancing is 
perhaps the greatest contribution of the Court in terms of accountability since 
it prioritises access amongst the countervailing interests at stake.  
 
The validity of wider access in legislative matters was confirmed in Access 
info.72 The General Court ruled that the Council erred not to disclose the 
identity of countries taking positions on the reform of the EU’s access to 
documents rules. In light of this, the Court stated that “in no way 
demonstrated”73 how publication of the country names would “seriously 
undermine its decision-making process”.74 It finds further that “if citizens are to 
be able to exercise their democratic rights, they must be in a position to follow 
in detail the decision-making process … and have access to all relevant 
information”.75 The Court of Justice confirmed this approach and rejected the 
appeal lodged by the Council.76 The Council, however, in practice continues 
not to publish the names of the national delegations and full access is 
confined to a successful request under the Regulation.  
 
The approach taken in Turco was very promising in terms of transparency and 
was described as “spectacularly” progressive.77 It has clearly provided with 
the foundations to disclose legal advice given also in the remit of the 
executive. This was recently upheld by the General Court and confirmed by 
the Court of Justice in In’t Veld.78 Yet, it is deemed necessary to revisit the 
wider contribution of Turco. A further and detailed examination indicates 
significant shortcomings of the judgment. In particular, the “general 
presumptions” line of reasoning undermines the fundamental nature of the 
access right. In this regard, the Court established that “[i]t is in principle, open 
to the Council to base its decisions […] on general presumptions which apply 
to certain categories of documents, as considerations of a generally similar 
kind are likely to apply to requests for disclosure relating to documents of the 
same nature.”79 The Court has effectively ruled that the Council, and by 
analogy all the other institutions, can deny access based on general 
considerations as opposed to the very well established rule for a specific and 
detailed examination. After the ruling, there now was every possibility that the 
institutions, the Commission in particular, would rely on general 
considerations to avoid carrying out a concrete appraisal of the requested 
documents. As a matter of principle, the Court after 15 years of construing the 
widest possible access reconsiders the essence of the right and finds that the 
institutions can now rely on general presumptions which by definition 
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constitute a threat to a properly reasoned decision. The later developments in 
the area of general presumptions provide sufficient evidence to revert what 
initially appears as spectacularly progressive. It has actually worsened the 
standards of accountability.  
 
The development of general presumptions settles the law with the 
establishment of a clear distinction between legislative, administrative and 
judicial documents and confirms the widest possible access as regards 
legislative documents.80 The later judgments in TGI,81 API,82 Agrofert83 and 
LPN84 show that the Court by citing Turco construed further the idea of 
presumptions and imposed unprecedented ramifications upon the access 
right and set the default position in relation to non-legislative documents to 
non-disclosure. The institutions can now offer a wide justification relating to 
the entire administrative file without even attempting to provide evidence that 
they have considered possible ways of dealing with the request. There is 
enough evidence which shows that the Commission denies access without 
even looking at the requested documents. Regrettably, they do so with the 
blessings of the Court. This is especially true in the light of the significant 
number of cases involving the application of general presumptions in relation 
to the administrative functions of the institutions. The following, therefore, 
considers this case law at length in this context and assesses the wider 
implications from the accountability perspective.  
 
Administrative documents: the end of the one by one examination? 
 
Despite the adoption of the Regulation, the state of transparency in the EU is 
still problematic. The institutions continuously rely on a culture of secrecy to 
deny access without even invoking the exceptions. This is clearly the case in 
regards to a large number of documents. In Verein für 
Konsumenteninformation,85 a consumers’ organisation, had sought access to 
the Commission’s administrative file containing 47,000 pages. The 
Commission refused access to the entire file on the grounds that partial 
access “would have represented an excessive and disproportionate amount of 
work for it”.86 While art. 6(3) of the Regulation provides for an informal 
consultation aiming to find a fair solution, art. 7(3) provides that the time limit 
for handling an application can, under certain circumstances, be extended. 
The Regulation does not provide in any provision for the requirements of 
concrete and individual assessment to be abandoned under any 
circumstances. Similarly, the Court noted that in the absence of a fair solution 
mentioned in art. 6(3), the Regulation provides no ruling similar to the one 
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developed through the jurisprudence of the Courts relating to the 
administrative burden.87 The Court moved on to note that the principle of 
proportionality may justify refusal of a concrete and individual examination to 
avoid cases where a manifestly unreasonable number of documents is 
requested which could result in paralysis of the proper functioning of the 
institution.88 
 
According to the Court, art. 6(3) reflects the possibility that where a very large 
number of documents is requested the institution can “reconcile the interests 
of the applicant with those of good administration”.89 As a result, there can be 
cases, in addition to the line of case law as regards general presumptions, 
according to which no individual examination is required. The Court observed 
that the possibility of non-concrete assessment must satisfy four 
requirements: 
 
i) The administrative burden entailed by concrete and individual examination 
must be heavy and exceed the limits of what may be reasonably required. 
 
ii) The burden of proof rests within the institution relying on its 
unreasonableness. 
 
iii) The institution must consult with the applicant in order to ascertain his 
interest and consider how it might adopt a measure less onerous than a 
concrete and individual examination. 
 
iv) The institution must prefer the most favourable option to the applicant’s 
right of access.90 
  
With great respect to the judgment, the validity of the criteria quoted above 
can be questioned. The requirements lack proper foundation on the 
legislation. Had the legislature wanted to incorporate the pre-Regulation case 
law on administrative burden it would have had every opportunity to do so. 
The legislature did not incorporate the pre-Regulation case law because they 
could not see how this restriction could fit with the principle of the widest 
possible access and with the requirement to interpret the exceptions narrowly. 
This approach in conjunction with the set of presumptions against openness 
questions the role of the Court in giving the access regime force. Both appear 
in contrast to what would seem to be more appropriate in order to safeguard 
the fundamental nature of the access regime.  
 
LPN91 is the first case of the Court of Justice in relation to the applicability of 
“general presumptions” line of case law to infringement proceedings. TGI92 
has effectively made the documents relating to the administrative functions of 
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the institutions essentially exempted from the one to one assessment since 
the Commission denied access without even looking at them and 
acknowledged that the public interest override will never apply unless 
particularly pertinent. Therefore, LPN93 guidance in relation to the application 
of general presumptions to infringement proceedings and the extent to which 
the override cannot be applied becomes more significant.  
 
Citing TGI and Turco, the Court confirmed the existence of a general 
presumption in the administrative file, in what appears to be a new 
development, to cover infringement proceedings, and held that to grant 
access to the file would endanger their protection (para 126 et seq. of the 
General Court). On appeal, the applicants, LPN and Finland, argued that the 
Commission denied access without carrying out, in violation of settled case 
law, a concrete and individual assessment of the requested documents.94 The 
Court ruled “… that it can be presumed (emphasis added) that the disclosure 
of the documents concerning an infringement procedure during its pre-
litigation stage risks altering the nature of that procedure and changing the 
way it proceeds and, accordingly, that disclosure would in principle undermine 
the protection of the purpose of investigations, within the meaning of the third 
indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001”.95 
 
The approach taken in LPN is fairly contentious, vague and in direct contrast 
with the Treaty framework, in particular with the requirements to take 
decisions as openly as possible pursuant to art. 1 TEU as well as with the 
overall wording of the Regulation. The Regulation provides with no basis for 
the establishment of general presumptions. The Court of Justice’s position 
regarding the administrative functions of the institutions and the applicability of 
a presumption against openness has significant constitutional ramifications on 
the fundamental aspect of the access right and incorporates limitations 
without the required level of explanation and clarity. Additionally, the Court 
fails to take into account the overriding public interest in the area. Overall, the 
judgment makes one to wonder if such an override cannot be established in 
an area where possible violations of EU law by Member States might take 
place then remains difficult to conceive a scenario where the override would 
ever be accepted by the Court.  
 
As a consequence, LPN confirms the applicability of a general presumption 
against openness in infringement proceedings. It treats in a rather paradoxical 
way a respectable non-governmental organisation as a mere “busybody” 
unable to invoke successfully the override. We see the Court to confirm 
categorically that openness secures public oversight of the EU’s decision-
making describing it as one of the fundamental credentials of the Union’s 
democratic society. Yet, we have evidence that the same Court provides with 
little or no contribution in relation to the opening up of the administrative 
functions of the institutions. The judgment significantly decreases public 
access and leaves intact the possibility of the Commission, and by analogy 
the other institutions, to refuse access as regards to the whole of the 
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administrative file without even looking at them, leaving aside the generic 
obligation to appraise on a document-by-document basis.  
 
Equally restrictive is the approach of the Court in relation to its own 
documents. Currently, it is presumed that disclosure of judicial documents is 
capable of causing harm, in a foreseeable way, to the outcome of court 
proceedings. In API,96 a non-profit-making organisation of foreign journalists, 
made a request to have access to the Commission’s submissions regarding, 
inter alia, a number of ongoing cases and one which, although closed, was 
related to an open case.97 The General Court ruled that the Commission 
could provide with a blanket refusal in relation to all written documents so long 
as the oral argument had not yet been presented. The rationale is to protect 
the interest of the litigant from external pressure until the case reaches the 
final stage of the hearing.98  
 
With great respect, the Court’s ruling was simply wrong to find that the 
Commission was in a position to refuse access to the whole category of 
judicial documents without following a concrete and individual examination 
and without stating its detailed reasons. The blanket refusal accepted by the 
Court, justified only by the fact that the litigant needs to protect its litigious 
interest and stay free from external pressure, seems to misunderstand the 
rationale of the access to documents regime.99 More importantly, it leaves the 
access to documents regime at a vulnerable stage. The mere fact that a 
document referred to in the application for access concerns an interest 
protected by an exception does not necessarily justify application of that 
exception. The exceptions are applicable only if the institution had previously 
assessed whether access to the document would specifically and actually 
undermine the protected interest and, if so, there was no overriding public 
interest under art. 4(2) and (3). The risk of the protected interest being 
undermined must not be purely hypothetical. Consequently, the examination 
which the institution must undertake needs to be carried out in a concrete 
manner and be apparent from the reasons given. Only a concrete and 
individual examination, as opposed to an abstract, overall examination, would 
enable the institution to assess the possibility of granting the applicant partial 
access pursuant to art. 4(6) of the Regulation. The institution’s obligation to 
undertake this type of assessment is applicable to all the exceptions found in 
paragraphs 1 to 3 of art. 4. 
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On appeal, the Court reiterated that the institutions may base their decisions 
on general presumptions since considerations of a similar kind are likely to 
apply to documents of the same nature.100 The Court confirmed that judicial 
documents are covered by a general presumption against openness and that 
disclosure of the pleadings would undermine their protection, covered by the 
exception of the second indent of art. 4(2), while those proceedings remain 
pending.101 As a result, the Commission bears no obligation “to carry out a 
concrete assessment of each document requested in order to determine 
whether, given the specific content of that document, its disclosure would 
undermine the court proceedings to which it relates”.102 
 
With this judgment, the Court of Justice significantly curtailed the already 
limited, public access as regards Court proceedings. Post API, the burden of 
proof to rebut the general presumption of non-disclosure rests on the 
applicant, whereas previously the institutions had the burden to prove that 
concrete and individual examination was not necessary.103 This is deeply 
unsatisfactory for the state of transparency and openness and in conjunction 
with the finding that the overriding public interest in transparency can only be 
taken into account as long as it is particularly pertinent leaves with no access 
right as regards judicial documents.104 Consequently, the decision of the Court 
comprises of poor jurisprudence in terms of accountability mainly for two 
reasons. Firstly, it decreases dramatically public access as regards judicial 
documents and sets the default position to non-disclosure and more 
fundamentally, it has the effect of transforming judicial activities from a 
discretionary to a mandatory category which results automatically to non-
disclosure.  
 
While it might reasonably be argued that non-disclosure of judicial documents 
might harm the particular sensitive nature and serenity of the proceedings, it 
is still apparent that the case law has narrowed the constitutional nature of the 
right without adequate explanation and clarity and has set the default position 
for judicial documents to non-disclosure. This interpretation applies to all of 
the executive powers of the Commission, for instance under the state aid and 
merger control procedures where the Court has established that a clear 
distinction should be made between legislative and administrative documents.  
In TGI,105 the Court confirmed the “settled case law” in relation to “…the 
existence of a general presumption that disclosure of documents in the 
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administrative file in principle undermines protection of the objectives of 
investigation activities”.106  Before examining the ongoing procedure to recast 
the existing Regulation and its problematic aspects, an overview of the 
application of the Member States’ documents and the role played by the Court 
in interpreting this final exception is discussed below.    
 
Art. 4(5) of the Regulation: documents originating from Member States  
 
This section reviews the nature of the documents regulated by art. 4(5)107 
which provides that “[a] Member State may request the institution not to 
disclose a document originating from that Member State without its prior 
agreement”. Pursuant to Recital 15 of the Regulation, the Member States’ 
legislation on access to official documents shall be unaffected since “it is 
neither the object nor the effect of that Regulation to amend national 
legislation on access to documents”.108 These provisions reflect what was 
agreed in Declaration No.35, annexed to the final Act of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam.  
 
The General Court in the Messina109 case did not rule explicitly that art. 4(5) 
grants the Member States a power of veto. It did so with its later rulings in the 
IFAW110 and Scippacercola111 cases. In IFAW, the General Court ruled that 
documents drafted by third parties can only be disclosed with the consent of 
the author, unless it is obvious that they can or cannot be disclosed. In the 
words of the judiciary, “consultation of the third party is, as a general rule, a 
precondition for determining whether the exceptions to the right of access 
provided for in art. 4(1) and (2) of the Regulation are applicable in the case of 
third-party documents”.112 As a result, when a Member State requests an 
institution not to disclose its own documents, the institution cannot do 
otherwise: “a request made by a Member State under Article 4(5) … [is] an 
instruction to the institution not to disclose the document in question”.113 The 
Court held that if institutions were entitled to disclose the documents despite a 
Member State’s objection this would risk the lex specialis of art. 4(5) 
becoming a dead letter.114 More regrettably, the General Court ruled that 
“[t]he Member State is under no obligation to state the reasons for any 
request made by it under Art. 4(5) of the regulation and, once it has made 
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such a request, it is no longer a matter for the institution to examine whether 
non-disclosure of the document in question is justified…”.115  
 
Interpreting “request” to the effect that Member States have a veto power is, 
however, not in line with the distinction between art. 4(5) and art. 9(3). The 
latter directly provides for the release of sensitive documents subject to the 
originator’s consent.116 Had the legislator wanted to grant a veto power to the 
Member States, it would have had every opportunity to do so by adopting a 
similar wording as to the originator’s consent in art. 9(3). The different wording 
adopted cannot justify similar treatment. The General Court ruled that if 
“request” was interpreted to mean that institutions were required to take into 
account the opinion of the Member State without necessarily following such 
an opinion, this would have resulted in equalising documents originating from 
any other third parties under art. 4(4)117 with art. 4(5) and, as such, rendering 
the provision of the latter a dead letter.118 This argument, however, seems to 
be no less problematic. Under art. 4(5), Member States always have the 
possibility of expressing their views, even in cases where institutions consider 
it obvious that access must be given or denied. On the contrary, this is not the 
case for third parties’ documents.  
 
The Court of Justice ruled in the IFAW119 appeal that Member States are 
obliged, under the duty of loyal cooperation, not to jeopardise the EU rules on 
access to documents. The Court has clarified that art. 4(5) does require joint 
implementation and cooperation amongst the administrations of the Member 
States and EU institutions. When the institution receives an application for 
access to a document drafted by any Member State, then a dialogue must 
take place in order to decide whether access must be granted. If the Member 
State objects, then it is required to do so within the time limits of art. 7(1) of 
the Regulation and justify the objection upon art. 4 (1) to (3).120 By not doing 
so, the institution is obliged to grant access, unless it considers that refusal 
must be denied following an assessment of art. 4. If the Member State 
provides a reasoned refusal, then the institution is obliged to incorporate it into 
its decision on access, allowing for the judicial review or the complaint 
procedure to the EU Ombudsman to take place.121 
 
The Court of Justice held that a Member State may also rely on its national 
rules on access to documents, since “there is nothing in the Regulation to 
exclude the possibility that compliance with certain rules of national law ... 
could be regarded as an interest deserving protection on the basis of the 
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exception laid down by that Regulation”.122 As a matter of principle, the finding 
that the exception does not provide Member States with an unconditional right 
of veto to object to the disclosure is of course again significant in terms of 
transparency. The judgment increased significantly public access as regards 
Member State documents and ruled that denial can only be justified by 
reference to art. 4(1) to (3) of the Regulation. In any case, contrary to what 
has been previously decided, a request given by any of the Member States 
cannot be interpreted as an absolute and unqualified power to prevent access 
regarding documents drafted by Member States. It is now clear from the 
judgment that the Court is prepared to apply a more stringent standard of 
judicial review as regards Member States’ documents. This approach is 
important from the accountability perspective since a significant number of the 
decided cases concern refusals under art. 4(5).   
 
Legislative procedure to amend the Regulation 
 
In April 2008, the Commission published a legislative proposal to recast the 
Regulation.123 Following the publication of the Commission’s proposal, the EP 
adopted a number of amendments and, after the Parliament’s requests, the 
Commission adopted a later proposal.124 On 15 December 2011, the EP 
approved the proposal. In light of these developments, this section reviews 
the most problematic aspects of the proposal and assesses whether the EU is 
about to enhance the existing status quo.125 As we have seen, the weak 
points of the current regime stem predominantly from the exceptions 
enshrined in the Regulation. Thus, in the amendment process, emphasis must 
be based upon the task of clarifying or even eliminating the exceptions. 
Rather regrettably, the procedure to recast the current access regime 
provides evidence to the contrary and the proposal itself is far from securing 
transparency.  
 
In particular, art. 2(6) of the Commission’s proposal reduces dramatically the 
current standards since it would leave outside the scope of the Regulation 
documents relating to individual decisions and investigations until the decision 
has been taken and the investigation has been closed or the act has become 
definitive. In addition, “documents containing information gathered or obtained 
from natural or legal persons by an institution in the framework of such 
investigations shall not be accessible to the public even after the closure of 
the investigation”. At present, art. 4(2) of the Regulation provides that the 
disclosure of documents which would undermine the protection of inspections, 
investigations and audits shall be refused, unless there is an overriding public 
interest following disclosure. In principle, however, in TGI,126 the Court of 
Justice confirmed that there is a general presumption that the disclosure of 
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investigation documents undermines their protection. If the proposed 
provision is adopted, in conjunction with TGI, this would constitute a step 
backwards in terms of the existing status quo, since this provision would not 
be protected by an overriding public interest in disclosure.  
 
The proposal defines documents as “[a]ny content whatever its medium… 
drawn-up by an institution and formally transmitted to one or more 
recipients or otherwise registered, or received by an institution…”.  This 
would exclude a substantial number of documents from the scope of the 
Regulation since a document drawn up by any of the institutions would not 
be accessible unless formally transmitted or otherwise registered. The 
institutions may intentionally avoid transmitting or registering a document 
to exclude them from the scope of the Regulation. This would support a 
culture of secrecy and be in direct contrast with settled case law, which 
provides that access is not confined to the documents but rather to the 
information contained in them.127 Consequently, the proposed definition is 
far from enshrining transparency and openness required by art. 1 TEU. 
 
Art. 4(2)(c) of the proposal would regulate legal advice and Court proceedings 
and reads as follows: 
 
“The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would 
undermine the protection of: 
(c) legal advice and court, arbitration and dispute settlement proceedings”.  
 
This exception does not take into account Turco.128 It should be amended to 
reflect that following a concrete and individual examination of the documents 
requested access to legal opinion should be rightly granted or denied. In 
addition, legal advice relating to procedures leading to a legislative act or a 
non-legislative act of general application should be excluded from the 
exception and therefore be disclosed. 
 
Currently, according to art. 4(3) of the Regulation, a document drawn up for 
internal use or received shall, pending the making of a decision, shall be 
refused if disclosure would seriously undermine the institution’s decision-
making process. Once the decision has been taken, the exception refers only 
to documents containing opinions for internal use as part of the deliberations 
and preliminary consultation. In either case, documents need to be disclosed 
if there is an overriding public interest in disclosure. These provisions apply to 
the negotiating position of the Member States and the Council in relation to 
legislative proposals. The proposed art. 4(3) would diminish standards 
dramatically to cover not only documents drawn up for internal use or 
received by an institution, but all documents. This is very disappointing 
because of the obligation to decide about legislation openly which constitutes 
enough justification to exclude the legislative activity from the scope of the 
exception. In order to do so and to improve current standards, this provision 
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must exclude documents relating to or leading to the adoption of a legislative 
act or a non-legislative act of general application.  
 
Art. 4(5) would make clearer the relationship between access to documents 
and the protection of personal data. The general rule would be that personal 
data should only be disclosed in accordance with the conditions regarding 
lawful processing of such data under EU legislation. But one exception would 
be introduced: there would be a presumption that the names, titles and 
functions of public office holders, civil servants and interest representatives 
would be disclosed insofar as they are acting in their professional capacity.  
  
The Commission has proposed to replace art. 4(1)(b) with a provision which 
would prevent disclosure if the person concerned could show that disclosure 
would “adversely affect” them. Such a ruling would constitute a drop in the 
current standards, as it would be very easy for the persons concerned to 
claim that they are adversely affected by the disclosure even though their 
privacy was not affected. The test proposed by the Commission and accepted 
by the EP regarding the “adverse effect” constitutes an additional requirement 
which would inevitably lead to abusive behaviour. 
 
According to art. 5(2) of the proposal, the decision to release documents 
originating from Member States but relating to the adoption of a legislative act 
or a non-legislative act of general application shall be taken by the institution. 
As a result, there would be no special treatment for a non-sensitive document 
originating from a Member State which is transmitted in the framework of 
procedures leading to a legislative act or a non-legislative act of general 
application. This reflects the view that a document sent by a Member State to 
the Council in this context is to be treated as if it were a document of the 
Council. However, art. 5(2) would retain the requirement for consultation 
before disclosure for non-legislative and non-sensitive documents. Member 
States would either rely on the exceptions of the Regulation or on their 
national law. Pursuant to the last part of art. 5(2), the institution would have to 
accept the reasons given without being able to assess the weight of those 
reasons. Such a proviso would significantly constitute a step backwards as 
long as the institutions would be obliged to accept vague reasons not properly 
justified. Overall, it can be safely said, rather regrettably, that the ongoing 
procedure to recast the existing transparency Regulation does not enhance 
transparency standards at all and must be amended in order to incorporate 




Access to documents is a crucial element for legitimacy and accountability in 
the EU since the ability of the citizenry to have access to information confirms 
the democratic aspect of the EU. It is rather impossible, without maximum 
access to the relevant information, for citizens to participate in the decision-
making process, to monitor and finally to hold “governmental” actors 
accountable. In this way, transparency enhances awareness, illustrates 
understanding of the ultimate objectives that the decision-making processes 
aim to achieve and finally grants legitimacy on decision-making. The Treaty of 
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Lisbon has provided a sufficient framework capable of enhancing further 
transparency and access to documents. If one compares the pre-Regulation 
rules, where the General Court held for instance that decisions on access to 
documents could be based purely on an institution’s Rules of Procedure, with 
the current situation, it can be safely argued that a fundamental right has been 
granted to the citizenry.129  
 
Similarly, the Regulation has improved the position governing access in 
several aspects. It has codified the exceptions and formally confirmed the 
widest possible access. The judiciary has also contributed, to a greater or 
lesser extent, in giving force to the right of access. It has achieved this in a 
more limited way by carefully avoiding to rule whether the right to access 
constitutes a general principle of EU law. Additionally, there are judgments 
that are fairly contentious, particularly in the area of administrative and judicial 
documents. This line of case law acknowledges the existence of general 
presumptions against openness and effectively sets the default position to 
non-disclosure. The paper illustrated that this is the most important limitation 
upon the fundamental aspect of the access regime. Nevertheless, the 
contribution of the judiciary should not be underestimated. A significant 
number of Council and Commission decisions denying access have been 
annulled by the EU Courts. 
  
Clearly, the weak points of the access regime stem predominantly from the 
exceptions to the right of access and, during the amendment process, 
emphasis should be based on reducing or even eliminating them. Regrettably, 
the ongoing procedure to recast the existing legislation indicates that, in the 
years to come, we may be in a completely new situation, not necessarily a 
better one. There is still hope and time for the legislature to eliminate the 
exceptions in a way that would truly support citizens’ participation in the 
decision-making process. Citizens need to be able to participate in a 
transparent decision-making process and be aware of what is happening in 
the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, so that they can exercise 
their democratic right of holding decision-makers accountable. The EU can 
only be democratic if the decision-making process secures openness. As it 
stands, the ongoing procedure to recast the existing transparency Regulation 
constitutes a lost opportunity. It does not enhance the current standards but 
rather establishes a step backwards in relation to the current status quo.  Still 
there is hope: the new Commission is required to amend the 2008 proposal, 
as a matter of urgency, by taking into account the requirements imposed by 
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